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I. Introduction
Pardon me for being one to state the obvious—but, the world is
changing. Among the many who do not need that fact reiterated to
them are officials in domestic and international law enforcement.
Today, where a crime is committed, where a suspect is located, and
where the evidence necessary to prosecute him or her exists are all
often found in locations throughout all corners of the globe.1 In
navigating this reality, law enforcement agencies around the world

† J.D. Candidate 2019, University of North Carolina School of Law.
1 Gail Kent, The Mutual Legal Assistance Problem Explained, THE CTR. FOR
INTERNET
&
SOC’Y
(Feb.
23,
2015,
1:06
PM),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/02/mutual-legal-assistance-problem-explained
[https://perma.cc/6XAD-Q6GL].
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are forced to reach outside of their jurisdictional bounds to request
data from various sources around the world.2 However, the legal
framework that currently exists governing cross-border information
sharing—Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (“MLATs”)—is
woefully inadequate.3 As a result, countries have begun to look for
workable alternatives to the existing process.4 The United States in
particular has recently proposed legislation which would provide an
alternative to the current MLAT regime and allow it to form direct,
one-on-one information-sharing agreements with other countries,
particularly the United Kingdom.5
In this paper, I argue, specifically with respect to the recently
proposed 2016 U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) legislation, that
these sort of MLAT “workaround,” cross-border information
sharing agreements are an effective alternative to the current MLAT
regime. They allow countries like the United States to more
efficiently produce and request data from other countries, all the
while ensuring adequate safeguards for the protection of human and
privacy rights. I first discuss the conditions which initially lead to
the MLAT framework, but which have now increasingly made that
framework unworkable. I then go on to describe the current MLAT
process, discuss its flaws as they exist currently, and argue that
solutions like those recently proposed in the United States,
including the 2016 DOJ legislation, are workable, alternative
solutions to the current process.6
See id.
Drew Mitnick, The Urgent Need for MLAT Reform, ACCESS NOW (Sept. 12, 2014,
5:42
PM),
https://www.accessnow.org/the-urgent-needs-for-mlat-reform/
[https://perma.cc/52S2-PD9D].
4 See id.
5 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGISLATION TO PERMIT THE SECURE & PRIVACYPROTECTIVE EXCHANGE OF ELECTRONIC DATA FOR THE PURPOSES OF COMBATING SERIOUS
CRIME
INCLUDING
TERRORISM
(2016),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2994379-2016-7-15-US-UK-Biden-WithEnclosures.html#document/p1 [https://perma.cc/94A9-FMXL] [hereinafter DOJ
Proposed Legislation].
6 At the time of submission, the U.S. Congress had adopted many of the provisions
of the 2016 DOJ proposed legislation in the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data
(CLOUD) Act of 2018. See Andrew Keane Woods & Peter Swire, The CLOUD Act: A
Welcome Legislative Fix for Cross-Border Data Problems, LAWFARE (Feb. 6, 2018, 5:49
PM),
https://lawfareblog.com/cloud-act-welcome-legislative-fix-cross-border-dataproblems [https://perma.cc/CUA5-BUUW]. The Act was passed in an omnibus spending
bill on March 23, and essentially “pave[d] the way for executive agreements—such as the
contemplated U.S.-U.K. agreement—to allow foreign governments to request content
2
3
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II. The Current Climate Surrounding International CrossBorder Data Sharing
Global technological change has reshaped the world in recent
years. Whether it be the effort to combat global climate change, or
the ability of companies to invest in cheap labor markets and export
products throughout the world, technological change is undoubtedly
the spark plug that continuously ignites new developments in
centuries old establishments and practices. One such area that has
been impacted dramatically as a result of this technological change
is the area of criminal law enforcement.7 As advancements in
technology allow individuals and countries to extend their reach
beyond invisible, national borders, countries are struggling to
navigate existing legal frameworks in an effort to catch defendants
who commit crimes in jurisdictions where they may, or may not be
physically present.8
The reason the current legal system is inadequate in allowing
law enforcement agencies around the world to catch criminals
effectively, is due, in part, to the fact that many crimes are now
committed in cyberspace.9 As a result, evidence of such crimes is
generally found on data servers which may or may not be in the
territorial jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency charged with
investigating, and ultimately prosecuting, the crime.10 Most of the
online service providers—like Google and Microsoft—which
maintain the servers for which this evidence is located, are
headquartered in the United States, but have offices and store data

directly from American providers.” Id.; see also Pete Williams, Supreme Court Seems Set
to Rule Against Microsoft in Email Privacy Case, NBC NEWS (Feb. 27, 2018, 12:49 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/gov-t-battles-microsoft-email-privacycase-supreme-court-n851216 [https://perma.cc/V789-E8JS] (predicting a Supreme Court
ruling against Microsoft, as expected from application of CLOUD Act). The Act has many
of the same provisions as the proposed DOJ legislation: it amends parts of the ECPA “to
allow providers to permit disclosures to certain foreign governments[,]” and allows the
president of the United States to enter into agreements with countries that meet a certain
set of requirements. Woods & Swire, supra note 6 . However, for the purposes of this
paper, the CLOUD Act itself is not considered because it adopts many of the provisions of
the 2016 DOJ proposed legislation, and therefore my arguments similarly apply.
7 See Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders: The
Evolving Security & Rights Issues, 8 J. OF NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 473 (2016).
8 Id. at 475.
9 See Kent, supra note 1.
10 Daskal, supra note 7, at 475—76.
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all over the world.11 Therefore, law enforcement agencies are
forced, when they need to obtain data stored by these companies in
gathering information on criminals they are prosecuting, to navigate
the international legal system in order to work with other countries,
where that data may be physically located, in order to obtain certain
evidence.12 This is a particularly difficult task when considering the
country in which the suspect is physically located, the country in
which the data is stored, and the country whose law enforcement
agency is conducting the investigation, all might be separate from
one another.13 As a result of this dilemma, law enforcement
agencies are forced to work with one another, each pursuant to their
own domestic laws, in requesting and obtaining information on
suspects they are investigating.14
III. The Current Legal Framework for International CrossBorder Data Sharing
Currently, however, law enforcement agencies around the world
struggle to obtain information on criminal suspects from each
other’s foreign governments, intelligence services, and law
enforcement agencies.15 This is primarily because the law that
governs the handing over of personal online information between
an online provider and a law enforcement agency is, traditionally,
the domestic law of the country in which the information is
physically located.16 Therefore, in addressing the need of law
enforcement agencies to work together in sharing information
across borders, countries have traditionally used MLATs.17
However, as the frequency of these types of modern crimes
increases, requests for information between countries has and will
continue to increase as well. As a result, navigating the MLAT
process in obtaining information for ongoing criminal
investigations has proven to be extremely burdensome and timeconsuming, and has been viewed as an inadequate solution to

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Kent, supra note 1.
See id.
Id.
Daskal, supra note 7, at 475—76.
Kent, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
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address ongoing and real-time threats.18 Thus, many countries,
including the United States, have begun to develop alternative legal
agreements to MLATs in order to more efficiently share
information with those countries with whom they share information
with most often.19 One example of such an alternative workaround
to the MLAT process is the proposed agreement between the United
States and the United Kingdom.20 The agreement would ultimately
“allow law enforcement officials in the United Kingdom to wiretap
or directly order companies to hand over user data stored in the
United States—and vice versa—without going through formal
processes.”21 The U.S. Department of Justice has advocated for the
ability to negotiate agreements like the one between the United
States and United Kingdom in its 2016 proposal to Congress.22 As
is discussed infra, these types of MLAT workaround agreements are
beneficial to law enforcement agencies who are straining to meet
the challenges posed by modern crimes, and countries around the
world, and the United States in particular, should negotiate these
types of MLAT workaround agreements with one another.
A. What Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties Are and How They
Work
Under the current MLAT system, in order to access any sort of
electronic information stored by data service providers, including emails, tweets, Facebook posts, etc., a country must abide by a
specific MLAT that it has negotiated with the country which
physically holds the information the former is attempting to
obtain.23 Since most data service providers are based in the United
States, countries looking to prosecute suspects within their own
territorial jurisdiction must rely on a MLAT it has formed with the
United States in order to obtain information located within the

Id.
Id.
20 Drew Mitnick, A Diagnosis: Why Current Proposals to Fix the MLAT System
Won’t
Work,
ACCESS
NOW
(May
2,
2017,
1:32
PM),
https://www.accessnow.org/diagnosis-current-proposals-fix-mlat-system-wont-work/
[https://perma.cc/BSP7-8CC9].
21 Id.
22 See DOJ Proposed Legislation, supra note 5.
23 Kent, supra note 1.
18
19
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territorial jurisdiction of the United States.24 The long, attenuated
process ultimately begins when the foreign law enforcement files a
request with its country’s own central filing agency. 25 That central
filing agency then contacts the U.S. Department of Justice (if
seeking to obtain information from a provider in the United States),
who works with that country to make sure the request meets U.S.
legal standards—that it complies with U.S. domestic law.26
Following the reception of the request and satisfaction that it does
meet the standards of U.S. domestic law, the Department of Justice
passes it along to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the district in which
the data provider is located.27 The U.S. Attorney then solicits a
magistrate judge to receive a court order, and sends that signed court
order to the U.S.-based company.28 Upon receiving the court order
making the request, the company is then ultimately required to send
any information along to the foreign law enforcement agency.29
B. Issues with the Current Legal Framework
Although the process may appear straightforward on paper, it is
has proven to be extremely burdensome to both the U.S. Department
of Justice and other foreign law enforcement agencies. This burden
is based predominantly on the fact that MLAT requests for
information have increased drastically in the past few years.30 In
2015, the DOJ stated in its fiscal year budget request that “request[s]
for assistance from foreign entities ha[d] increased nearly 60%, and
the number of requests for computer records increased tenfold[.]’”31 This increase in cross-border information requests puts
an additional strain on the government entities responsible for both
sending and receiving the requests, and as a result the time it takes
to fully comply with a MLAT request is burdensomely long.32 For
Id.
See Tiffany Lin & Mailyn Fidler, Cross-Border Data Access Reform: A Primer on
the Proposed U.S.-U.K. Agreement, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y 1, 2
(Sep. 7, 2017, 3:20 PM), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33867385/201709_berklett.pdf [https://perma.cc/N92L-UHY3].
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 2—3.
30 Id.
31 Lin & Fidler, supra note 25, at 4.
32 Kent, supra note 1.
24
25
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example, the United Kingdom has reported that requests for crossborder information via MLATs can take over a year—up to 13
months.33 In addition, “[t]he UN Cybercrime Study of 2013
indicates that most countries ‘reported median response times of . . .
150 days for mutual legal assistance requests, received and sent . . . .
It is clear that the use of formal cooperation mechanisms occurs on
a timescale of months, rather than days.’”34 This issue is particularly
apparent when law enforcement agencies are conducting ongoing
investigations, in which they need particular information that not
only supports the guilt of a criminal for a prior committed act, but
in preventing the commission of future crimes as well.35
The issues with MLATs extend far beyond the exorbitant
amount of time they take to fulfill. For one, countries around the
world have grown increasingly frustrated that “U.S. law essentially
determines global practices.”36 Since most data providers reside and
operate in the United States, most law enforcement agencies will
need to utilize MLATs they have negotiated with the United States
in carrying out their investigations, and thus are subject to U.S. data
privacy laws.37 Moreover, determining the exact location of the data
can be difficult.38 Many providers, including Microsoft and Google,
store data in various locations around the world in order to protect
that data from regional political issues, for cost purposes, or for
purposes of speed and efficiency.39 This is problematic because the
data protection law that is applied in determining MLAT requests is
the law of the jurisdiction in which the data is stored.40 Thus, issues
related to data privacy and free speech arise when countries request
stored online information from another country with substantially
different domestic laws and protections than the requesting
country.41

Id.
Id.
35 See Daskal, supra note 7, at 480.
36 Lin & Fidler, supra note 25, at 4.
37 Drew Mitnick, What’s Wrong with the System for Cross-border Access to Data,
ACCESS NOW (Apr. 25, 2017, 1:22 PM), https://www.accessnow.org/whats-wrong-systemcross-border-access-data/ [https://perma.cc/5AZ2-XXGL].
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See id.
33
34
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IV. Current and Proposed Solutions to the Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty Problem
In response to these concerns, countries have taken a number of
different approaches. Some countries have begun imposing strict
data localization laws, limiting the use of encryption to protect data,
and passing new extraterritorial laws which permit their law
enforcement agencies to unilaterally circumvent the law of the
jurisdiction in which the data is stored, and to ultimately order the
provider to hand over the data or face a penalty.42 Concerns have
been raised, and rightly so, about these new techniques, which
prevent consistency in cross-border data sharing, do not ensure
adequate privacy safeguards of user information, put data providers
in a legal stranglehold, and encroach on national sovereignty.43
Other, more workable solutions have been raised however. The
most satisfactory of these is the use of unilateral agreements
between countries themselves, which would permit the parties to the
agreement to bypass the MLAT process entirely. The agreement
would allow one country to reach out to a data provider located in
the other country, which is a party to the agreement, and submit an
information request pursuant to the requesting country’s own
domestic laws, and not the domestic laws of the country in which
the provider is located or the information is stored, as was the case
under the traditional MLAT regime.44 Thus, these sort of
“workaround” agreements would subject foreign companies to the
domestic laws of the country requesting the information in the first
place, and not the domestic laws of the country in which the
information is actually being stored.45 Presumably as a result of this
new legal mechanism’s perceived usefulness, some countries, in
addition to the United States and United Kingdom, have begun to
draft proposals for new MLAT workaround agreements.46 For
example, the European Union (EU) is currently “reviewing digital
evidence rules that would apply to all EU countries, and the Council
of Europe is in the early stages of negotiations to grant greater direct
access to the countries party to the Convention of Cybercrime

42
43
44
45
46

Id.
Mitnik, supra note 37.
Kent, supra note 1.
See Mitnick, supra note 20.
Id.
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(Budapest Convention).”47
A. The Proposed 2016 Department of Justice Legislation
The U.S. Department of Justice proposed legislation to
Congress in July of 2016 that would allow and ultimately permit the
United States to engage in negotiating these MLAT workaround
agreements.48 According to the proposal, the United States would
be permitted to enter into bilateral agreements with other countries
(including the United Kingdom), and U.S.-based companies would
be required to provide stored information to law enforcement
agencies of countries parties to the agreement pursuant to the
requesting countries own domestic law, and not the domestic law of
the United States.49 United States courts would thus not have to act
as an intermediary in reviewing, approving, and issuing a court
order for every information request made by a foreign law
enforcement agency, as is currently the practice under the traditional
MLAT regime.50 Instead, companies like Google, Facebook, and
Microsoft, who are headquartered and store information inside the
territory of the United States would be subject to lawful requests
made for that stored information, pursuant to the requesting
country’s domestic law.51 The 2016 draft proposal sets out
particular standards other countries must meet before the United
States government could enter into such an agreement with them,
and it “establishes parameters on what [type of information] the
requests can include. For instance, requests must pertain to a
serious crime, including terrorism.”52
The proposed legislation would also amend certain parts of Title
III of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”).53 It
would amend the Wiretap Act, Stored Communications Act
(“SCA”), and Pen/Trap Statute—all parts of the ECPA—“to allow
service providers to intercept, access, and disclose communications
content and metadata in response to an order from a foreign
government, if that order is pursuant to an executive agreement that
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id.
See DOJ Proposed Legislation, supra note 5.
Id.
Lin & Fidler, supra note 25, at 4—6.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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the Attorney General, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State,
has determined, and certified to Congress, meets several statutory
conditions.”54 These statutory conditions would be implemented to
ensure that the requesting country’s domestic law affords
substantial protection for the privacy rights and civil liberties of the
American public.55 Included among these particular conditions are:
“substantive and procedural laws on cybercrime and electronic
evidence; evidence of respect for the rule of law and principles of
non-discrimination, and adherence to applicable international
human rights obligations; [and] mechanisms to provide
accountability and transparency for data collection[.]”56
Furthermore, the request of information itself must not infringe
on an individual’s freedom of speech, it must be subject to review
by a U.S. magistrate, judge, or other official, and it must be based
on a sound legal justification and articulated facts.57 Finally, the
foreign government must afford reciprocity to the United States by
allowing it to submit requests for information pursuant to U.S.
domestic law, the foreign government must agree to periodic
reviews of compliance, and the requesting country must review for
and delete any irrelevant information that was sent over.58
Ultimately, if the United Kingdom, or any other country for that
matter, could not successfully comply with the terms of the
executive order, they would still have the option to request
information through the MLAT process.59 However, this particular
piece of legislation removes the requirement that the U.S.
government personally review each new request for information
from U.S.-based companies, which has proven to be a primary point
of contention regarding the new legislation.60

54 Memorandum from Peter Kadzik, Assistant Attorney Gen., to The Honorable
Joseph R. Biden (July 15, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum].
55 Lin & Fidler, supra note 25, at 5.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 6.
60 Id. at 5 (“[O]rders do not undergo individual inspection by the U.S. government,
making the vetting of countries for the executive agreement [like the one between the U.S.
and U.K.] the single guaranteed point of scrutiny.”).
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B. The Effect of the Proposed DOJ Legislation
It is clear that a workable alternative to the current MLAT
regime needs to be implemented, particularly since those situations
which give rise to the need for any type of agreement in the first
place—where a law enforcement agency of one country is forced to
request information from a government or company in another
country, outside of its jurisdictional bounds—will only continue to
increase dramatically. The proposed 2016 DOJ legislation provides
an example of legislation that would permit a country, like the
United States, to implement such an alternative. Therefore, in
underscoring the advantages and disadvantages of these MLAT
workaround agreements as a whole, it is helpful to analyze the
advantages and disadvantages of the DOJ legislation in particular,
and the power it gives the United States to enter into such
agreements.
For now, the DOJ proposed legislation is sufficient as an
alternative to the current MLAT system in that it addresses the key
weaknesses of the current system. This new piece of legislation
would essentially do the following: (1) it would ease the burden on
the U.S. government, and like parties to the agreement (e.g. the
United Kingdom), in providing and receiving information pertinent
to criminal investigations; (2) it would prevent U.S.-based data
providers from becoming entangled in legal conflicts which may
arise when one country’s law enforcement agency demands
information that U.S. domestic law would otherwise not permit that
company to produce; (3) it would ensure reciprocity for United
States law enforcement agencies seeking to obtain information
about their own ongoing investigations; and (4) it would create a set
of norms and standards that both the United States and the rest of
the world can use in formulating such cross-border data sharing
agreements, while also preventing data localization and providing
adequate safeguards for individual and civil liberties.61
First, the most obvious advantage of these MLAT workaround
agreements, generally, is that they greatly reduce the burdens that
electronic communication service providers, as well as the
governments of countries that are party to the agreements, face
under the current MLAT system.62 The DOJ proposal in particular,

61
62

See Memorandum, supra note 54, at 1—3.
Id. at 1—2.
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and ultimately the creation of bilateral MLAT workaround
agreements themselves, would drastically ease the burden on the
governments of the United States and United Kingdom, and like
countries, in complying with the ever-increasing MLAT requests
for information. This legislation does this by removing the critical
barrier of forcing the government in which the service provider is
located to effectively scan the request and make sure that it complies
with domestic law, which is the hallmark of the MLAT system.63
This characteristic seems to be the most contentious, since
advocates of these agreements see that element as the clog in the
system, while opponents see that element as necessary for ensuring
privacy and human rights.64 However, under the proposed
legislation, just because the United States would no longer be
responsible for “approving” requests for information from law
enforcement agencies in the United Kingdom and other countries it
enters into such agreements with, it does not mean that those
requests will not still provide adequate safeguards for individual and
civil liberties. The proposed legislation would simply replace U.S.
domestic law governing information requests with the law of the
United Kingdom in this particular area.65 In addition, the proposed
legislation comes with the added safeguard that the applicable U.K.
law governing information requests from U.S.-based companies
must be cleared by the Attorney General, “with the concurrence of
the Secretary of State, to determine and certify to Congress that
foreign partners have met obligations and commitments designed to
protect privacy and civil liberties.”66 However, maintaining the
current system, which puts the burden on the “home” country to
give the green light for every request for information that the
requesting country’s law enforcement agency has submitted, creates
an unnecessary middleman in every single transaction.
Second, companies would no longer find themselves caught in
the “difficult [legal] position” of receiving a request for data that
contradicts U.S. law.67 Under the current regime, U.S.-based data
providers confront situations in which they “[e]ither comply with a
foreign order, and risk a violation of U.S. law, or they refuse to
63
64
65
66
67

Lin & Fidler, supra note 25, at 4—5.
See Daskal, supra note 7, at 496—97.
Lin & Fidler, supra note 25, at 7.
Memorandum, supra note 54, at 2.
Id.
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comply and risk violating federal law.”68 United States Assistant
Attorney General Peter Kadzik notes, in his memorandum
supporting the proposed 2016 legislation, that “[s]ome countries
have [even] begun to take enforcement actions against U.S.
companies, imposing fines or even arresting company
employees.”69 Under the new legislation, companies would not be
subject to both the law of the domestic territory in which they reside
as well as subject to the foreign law of the country making the
request. They would only need to comply with the law of the
country making the request, thus alleviating the legal stranglehold
many companies currently face.70 In addition, under the proposed
legislation, companies would have the option of complying with the
information request or not, subject to their own determinations.71
Third, the proposed legislation, and agreement with the United
Kingdom arising therefrom, would ensure reciprocity for the U.S.
law enforcement agencies seeking to collect data from providers
located in the United Kingdom, or storing information in the United
Kingdom.72 This would alleviate the burden on domestic law
enforcement agencies seeking to obtain information pursuant to
ongoing investigations.
Finally, the proposed legislation would establish a “framework”
to serve as the basis for other similar agreements between both the
United States and other countries, as well as between other countries
themselves.73 Assistant Attorney General Kadzik stated as much
when he emphasized that this legislation would:
establish a framework and standards that could be used to reach
similar agreements with other countries whose laws provide
robust protections of human rights, privacy, and other
fundamental freedoms. It could thereby increase protections for
privacy and civil liberties globally, as countries seeking to qualify
for such agreements would need to demonstrate that their legal
systems meet these requirements.74

Id.at 1.
Id.at 2.
70 Lin & Fidler, supra note 25, at 7.
71 Id.
72 Memorandum, supra note 54, at 3 (highlighting that the proposed legislation
would “[ensure] reciprocal access to data for U.S. investigations”).
73 Id. at 2.
74 Id.
68
69
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However, many civil liberties groups, including the American
Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), Human Rights Watch, and
Amnesty International, argue that these agreements, and this piece
of legislation in particular, do not go far enough in protecting
individual privacy and civil liberties.75 However, safeguards do
exist in the proposed legislation which require the Attorney General
and Secretary of State to certify that the country with which the
United States enters into an agreement provides certain safeguards
and meets certain requirements. It provides that any future
agreements could be modified or extended based on the particular
requirements and domestic laws of the countries with which they
are entered.76
Without a basis for creating a workable alternative to the
currently unsustainable MLAT regime, a vacuum exists where
countries, unable to meet or tolerate the demands of the current
MLAT system will, and have already started to, revert to solutions
that substantially reduce protections for civil liberties.77 One
example of such a situation is the fact that certain countries, like
Russia and China, have begun implementing data localization laws
which require companies to physically store their data in that
particular country’s jurisdiction.78 United States—based companies
could instead store their data here in the United States and be subject
to the legal requirements of a foreign government with whom it has
already cleared as ensuring that their disclosure laws maintain
adequate safeguards for civil liberties. The alternative would be a
situation where these “data localization laws” are passed and United
States—based companies are forced to comply with the domestic
law of countries that do not provide such adequate safeguards.79
The former is simply a more viable alternative than the latter,
both in terms of privacy and efficiency. As one scholar notes,
although the privacy protections afforded by other countries with
whom the United States negotiates these agreements might not rise
to the same standard as that articulated in the Fourth Amendment.80

Lin & Fidler, supra note 25, at 7.
Memorandum, supra note 54, at 2.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Andrew Keane Woods & Peter Swire, The CLOUD Act: A Welcome Legislative
Fix for Cross-Border Data Problems, LAWFARE (Feb. 6, 2018, 5:49 PM),
75
76
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But the Fourth Amendment should not be the benchmark since the
alternative is exactly this sort of “data localization” in countries
which are plummeting in the opposite direction of ensuring the
privacy rights of the Fourth Amendment. “As compared to that
world[,]” he notes, this proposed legislation “offers privacy
advocates quite a lot.”81
Another concern has been raised about presidential powers.
Specifically, what happens when the president of the United States,
who would have the power under this legislation to enter into these
bilateral MLAT workaround agreements, negotiates agreements
with some countries but not others.82 This would leave some of the
world’s biggest markets, such as India and Brazil, in the cold and
would incentivize them to mandate localization.83 However, this is
a risk inherent to any bilateral workaround agreement.84 It is safe to
assume that world leaders, and the U.S. president in particular,
would do all in their power to negotiate agreements with countries
with whom U.S. law enforcement agencies most need information.
A further solution is to permit the United States to negotiate these
agreements with specific law enforcement agencies of countries,
and not the country themselves.85 This negotiation might serve as a
more “streamlined approached,” however, it is clear that while there
are still wrinkles, these MLAT workaround agreements are the best
alternative to the current system. The 2016 DOJ proposed
legislation in particular, is a step in the right direction.
V. Conclusion
Ultimately, there is still work left to be done, but the 2016 DOJ
proposed legislation is the best alternative to the current MLAT—
regime. One that has proven incapable of meeting the demands of
law enforcement agencies around the world. This proposed
legislation, which would allow the United States to enter into a
bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom and other countries,
serves as an illustrative example of the advantages and drawbacks
https://lawfareblog.com/cloud-act-welcome-legislative-fix-cross-border-data-problems
[https://perma.cc/U94R-LQWC].
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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of these types of MLAT workaround agreements. While there is
still room for improvement, among the many different things this
piece of legislation does, it establishes a framework for other
countries to use in drawing up their own bilateral agreements with
the United States and others. One thing, however, is clear—
something needs to be done to replace the current MLAT regime.
One which has proven to be incapable of meeting the information
sharing demands of law enforcement agencies in the twenty-first
century. These MLAT workaround agreements appear to be the
most viable alternative.

